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In Reading Machiavelli, John McCormick continues the argument begun in his first book,
Machiavellian Democracy, and in a host of journal articles, that Machiavelli is correctly understood as a
proponent of populist government. Also continued here is the application of Machiavelli to democratic
theory and contemporary political debates.
The two parts of Reading Machiavelli focus respectively on Machiavelli’s writings and on
Machiavelli scholarship. McCormick ably investigates one chapter from The Prince, one chapter from the
Discourses, and three historical episodes from the Florentine Histories. In the second part he delivers
stinging rebukes of Rousseau, Strauss, and the Cambridge school, represented by Pocock and Skinner. Each
target is charged with underplaying, ignoring, or falsifying plain evidence of the populist commitments of
Machiavelli and with misrepresenting him as an aristocratic/oligarchic republican in the mold of Aristotle,
Cicero, and Bruni, later of Harrington, Montesquieu, and Madison. An added and interesting feature, giving
rise to the title, is the claim that Machiavelli is properly read only when his evaluative statements are put
against his descriptions of events. Machiavelli adopts an elusive style of writing meant to serve pedagogical
and self-protective purposes. This style McCormick calls “literary-rhetorical” (8).
All the above is closely argued and elegantly rendered.
The first substantive chapter is on Prince 7 and the career of Cesare Borgia. McCormick interprets
the chapter as a Christian allegory. Thus, the Holy Father Alexander VI and his son Cesare are stand-ins
for God and Jesus Christ. Pagolo Orsini, once called Paolo, is St. Paul. The dinner at Senigallia is the Last
Supper. The piece of wood displayed next to the bifurcated body of Remirro de Orco is the cross and
Crucifixion. The date of Remirro’s execution, December 26, 1502, is St. Stephen’s day, when nobles bestow
gifts on the poor, making the execution a covenant with the “prince of peace.” January 1, the date when the
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newborn Jesus was circumcised, is the cutting of Remirro, Cesare’s “political phallus.” Finally, the
disappearance of Cesare—meaning his removal to Spain—is the Ascension of Christ.
William Parsons, in his recent book Machiavelli’s Gospel (University of Rochester Press, 2016)
reads the whole of The Prince this way, as a Christian allegory aimed at subverting the faith. McCormick
draws a somewhat different conclusion, that Machiavelli is proposing an armed populism as the true
interpretation of Christianity, the union of Old Testament ferocity with New Testament charity. McCormick
observes, “the parable of Cesare Borgia suggests that Christianity offers unprecedented possibilities for
founding princely authority upon popular legitimacy—opportunities that Theseus, Cyrus, Romulus, or even
Moses did not fully explore.” McCormick then asks rhetorically, “what if one could in principle champion
the weak, as does Christianity, but not in practice leave them weaponless, as did the most important
unnamed, unarmed prophet in The Prince?” (42). At this juncture McCormick might well be on his way
toward liberation theology, the harnessing of transcendental Christianity to secular, egalitarian ambitions.
But he stops short and instead calls armed populism “political idealism” (43), of the sort that has an unarmed
prophet conquering the future through the power of his books. Or perhaps not conquering at all, for political
idealism is next dismissed as a “kingdom . . . made of ‘air’” and an unreal grandiosity, like the project of
unifying Italy (44). In any event, it’s uncertain as to whether armed populism is still being offered as the
true interpretation of Christianity.
There is, though, a bit of armed populism recommended, if not indeed executed, in the final act of
Cesare, the favorite of the people and named by them Valentino. That famous mistake committed by Cesare,
and that brings down Machiavelli’s lone censure, namely, his agreeing to the installation of Giuliano della
Rovere as Pope Julius II, could have been averted if Cesare had made the papacy hereditary and installed
himself as pope, or if he had ended the papacy altogether, killing en masse the College of Cardinals.
McCormick conjectures that as a “good Catholic boy” (38), Cesare, then desperately ill, was seeking
salvation at his hour of death from the new Holy Father. Says McCormick, “A certain Christian frame of
mind . . . presently inclines the duke to act, in Rome, in a manner diametrically opposed to how he
previously behaved in Senigallia or Cesena” (39).
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Two objections come to mind. First, if the Holy Father has special powers to forgive—a view at
variance with Catholic doctrine, by the way—any Holy Father would do, and Cesare was in a position to
block Giuliano’s ascension to the papacy. Second, Cesare expected not forgiveness per se (37-39), an act
suggestive of sin and redemption, but forgetfulness, of his, or his father’s, injury to Giuliano. Here is the
relevant passage from The Prince: “And whoever believes that among great personages new benefits will
make old injuries be forgotten deceives himself” (dimenticare—though with “forgiveness” as a secondary
meaning). The usual, and nonallegorical, explanation of Cesare’s mistake is that Valentino, a man of the
people, knew the popular mind but not the mind of the great, specifically that the great are never grateful.
McCormick’s study of the Discourses zeroes in on chapter 37 of book I. The subject of 37 is
agrarian legislation; the argument is that the plebeians erred—caused scandals—when in the time of the
Gracchi brothers a campaign was launched to revive long-lapsed agrarian laws. Although Machiavelli
supports the intention of limiting and redistributing private wealth, timing is important, and the agrarian
policy, when later resuscitated, began the civil wars that ended the republic. Plebeian motives are also
impugned, because, having fought for the tribunate out of necessity, only out of ambition did the plebs fight
to share wealth and honors with the nobles.
The chapter, like several others, has the effect of blurring the class divide. Both classes are
ambitious; both covet money more than they covet offices. McCormick though is determined to defend the
class divide, because he is determined to place the blame for disturbances all on the nobles. The people can
be excused for favoring tyrants since economic desperation is always the cause (60-61). Likewise,
inequality is the cause of societal corruption, thus agrarian laws are a good thing, no matter when they
occur. This likely goes too far, misreads 37, notwithstanding Machiavelli’s insistence that corruption would
have come sooner without agrarian agitation; for, as Machiavelli later says, “to try to take away a disorder
that has grown in a republic, and because of this to make a law that looks very far back, is an ill-considered
policy.” And not mentioned are various other sources of corruption, for example, servility (I.16), security
(I.18), irreligion (I.55), and foreign influence (I.55).
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Chapter 37 provides another instance of armed populism, albeit unspoken. For the problem facing
the Gracchi, says McCormick, was not bad timing so much as the too-little power they held as tribunes.
The senate stood in their way; accordingly, the senate needed to go. The hidden teaching of 37 is that the
Gracchi and the plebs should have slaughtered the senators, just as Agathocles, Clearchus, and Cleomenes
had done in times past. Of course, Machiavelli does not say destroy the senate; but the reason for his
reticence, McCormick supposes, is that the two young aristocrats to whom the book is addressed would
have been aghast to learn of Machiavelli’s true intentions, and so Machiavelli needed to trim and conceal.
The “literary-rhetorical” mode of writing, known by everyone else as esotericism, speaks through silences.
That may be true, but would not the esoteric requirement apply to the whole of the Discourses, and not to
chapter 37 alone? Where is trimming and concealing in I.3 where the nobles are called “malignant”?
McCormick has one objective in the chapter on the Florentine Histories, namely, to refute
“conservative-turn” scholars, as he dubs them, who find in the Histories a reevaluation of the class
preferences exhibited by Machiavelli in The Prince and the Discourses. Overt criticisms of the people in
the former text, the Histories, contradict words of praise in the latter two. McCormick examines three
instances of civil discord in Florence: the 1343 expulsion of the duke of Athens; the 1295 expulsion of
Giano della Bella; and the Ciompi revolt of 1378. He argues that in all cases the positive actions of the
people, as described by Machiavelli, belie the negative judgments of the people, as offered by Machiavelli.
The explanation is the same as before, that Machiavelli’s patrons, the Medicis this time, needed to be tricked
and wooed.
A pair of corollaries to the conservative-turn position are additionally dismissed: (1) that
Machiavelli changes his support from the two-class social division in Rome (patricians and plebeians) to
the three-class social division in Florence (ottimati, popolo, and popolo minuto); and (2) that Machiavelli
indicates a partiality for Venetian constitutionalism by the reforms he proposes in his 1520 “Discursus on
Florentine Affairs.” In the first case, answers McCormick, Machiavelli is adjusting to current
socioeconomic realities and to the fact that Florence was an ill-founded state in the beginning and evolved
into a poorly functioning commercial republic in the present. To the second, McCormick responds that the
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aristocratic-like institutions proposed in the “Discursus” are expected to succumb to democratizing forces
once the Medici pope has died, just as Rome moved ineluctably from monarchy, to aristocratic republic, to
democratic republic.
McCormick’s careful reading of the Florentine Histories may very well establish the point of an
unaltered assessment of the people across all books, but is that assessment unvaryingly positive? For in
Prince 18, the people are branded ends-justify-means rationalizers, as well as fools easily taken in by
appearances; and in Discourses I.53 and III.11 the Roman plebs and their tribune defenders are each called
“insolent.” Nor are the nobles consistently condemned, for Quintius Cincinnatus is put forward as a good
and prudent patriot who saved the republic from early demise by refusing a prolongation of his command
in imitation of the tribunes who had extended theirs (III.24).
Part II begins with an investigation of Rousseau’s Social Contract. According to McCormick, a
great injustice has been done to democratic theory by democratic theorists, who credit Rousseau, and not
Machiavelli, as the source of their inspiration. Rousseau is unworthy, says McCormick, because in book
IV of the Social Contract, he commends the Roman practice of weighted voting in the centuriate assembly,
scorns the exclusion of patricians from the tribal assembly, judges clientelism “admirable” and “humane,”
and minimizes the importance of the tribunate. Rousseau’s Rome is an aristocratic republic where the rich
govern and the poor are granted some few protections from the abuse of power. McCormick concludes that
Rousseau is more disturbed by the poor in power than he is devoted to equality and the general will.
It is undeniable that book IV poses a problem and comes as a surprise. Rousseau’s singlechambered assembly, operating by consensus and expressing the general will, is overlain onto a Roman
assembly that bears no resemblance and serves a different purpose. The standard explanation is that
Rousseau is trying to prove the applicability of the general will to communities larger than city-states,
composed of populations more diverse than peasants under a tree. But that explanation cannot account for
the laudatory language used to describe institutions manifestly inegalitarian and contrary to the
prescriptions of the theoretical books that precede.
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Three quick comments are in order. One, a point-by-point comparison of each author’s Rome is
hardly possible, because Machiavelli shows little interest in legislative power and speaks but rarely and
vaguely about Rome’s several assemblies. Two, Rousseau, drawing on Cicero, probably provides the more
accurate account. And three, even if Rousseau’s Rome makes for a clumsy case study of the general will,
why choose to interpret the early books of the Social Contract in light of last book and so recast Rousseau
as an aristocratic republican? The opposite choice, it so happens, is made respecting Machiavelli, that the
last book, the Florentine Histories, be read in light of the early books, The Prince and the Discourses.
Leo Strauss comes in for heavy criticism, and here the attack seems personal: “Strauss’s
fundamental moral outlook [called “nonobjective” and “prerational” (145)] . . . is the belief that no genuine
philosopher could actually favor in any serious way the judgment of peoples over [that] of elites”; further,
“‘a powerful prejudice’. . . in favor of the few over the many seems to have decisively impacted his
interpretation of Machiavelli’s political thought” (174). Very carefully does McCormick review Strauss’s
many antipopulist reflections, touching on such subjects as the scope of popular participation—whether
active or reactive; the quality of popular judgment—whether confined to particulars or extending to
generalities; the number of recorded mistakes committed by the people vs. the elite; the “iron law of
oligarchy,” so called, whereby any plebeian leader becomes a patrician by the mere fact of office-holding;
the contrast between superhuman founder princes and all-too-human senatorial princes; and the
philosophical young, noticed and cultivated, as opposed to the “sons of Brutus,” ignored and forgotten, with
the result that their recommended destruction through popular tribunals disappears from Machiavelli’s
counsel.
Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli is much too complex a book to allow for quick confirmation or
rejection of these claims (but compare McCormick 8 with Strauss 127). Even so, Strauss is likely not the
opponent McCormick thinks him to be. Strauss describes Machiavelli and his enlightenment project as
radically egalitarian, reflecting the belief that human beings are merely animals. They may divide into lions,
foxes, wolves, or sheep, but that sortition is less consequential than the fact that all are mortal and needy,
and that all are the intended audience for Machiavelli’s liberationist message. The political question of who
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rules, so important to McCormick, is secondary to the philosophical question of rule for what purpose. That
purpose is acquisition, a populist ambition.
Pocock and Skinner are criticized for folding Machiavelli into the civic-humanist tradition, with its
goal of balance, harmony, and ordered liberty under the wise governance of aristocratic elites. Largely read
out of Machiavelli, therefore, is his devotion to faction, tumult, and the active, ongoing involvement of the
plebs. Somehow Pocock and Skinner missed the early chapters of the Discourses where Machiavelli
chooses the democratic republic of Rome over the aristocratic republics of Sparta and Venice.
If I may speak now for myself, I agree that Machiavelli is a populist, provided that populism is
contained inside a mixed regime. Machiavelli’s sympathies are with the people—that I do not doubt—but
less because the people are good than because the people are inert, credulous, and deferential to a fault, and
so require constant prodding if they are to do their part in protecting liberty. But they can overreach, threaten
liberty instead of guard it, at which point Machiavelli switches sides, lending assistance to the nobles, whose
astuteness is as much needed by the state as the people’s goodness. This he does in Discourses I.37, I think,
and in many other chapters, giving advice on how to slow down the march toward simple-regime
democracy, or admiring Roman practices that accomplished the same (e.g., temporizing, anticipation,
cooptation). Democratic Athens, a simple regime with a single-chambered assembly, is rated much inferior
to Rome’s mixed regime (D. I.2). While full democracy is inevitable once the plebs are armed (D. I.60),
the constitutional challenge is to delay indefinitely the moment of its arrival, because full democracy
descends into the tyranny of one-man rule, completing the transit of the cycle of regimes. Does McCormick
agree? I’m not sure. He once acknowledges that Machiavelli is “an advocate of mixed constitutions” (198).
But on other occasions, McCormick’s enthusiasm for the popular cause seems to glide into enthusiasm for
pure democracy (e.g., 47-48, 115, 121, 129), cyclical history seems to straighten into linear progressive
history (e.g., 138-40), and Machiavelli, the apologist for cruelty well-used, seems to morph into Cicero or
Erasmus, asserting the unproblematic utility of (plebeian) virtue and promising peace on earth from virtue’s
empowerment (e.g., 78-82, 95-96). Despite reveling unashamedly in the rough and tumble of Machiavellian
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politics, McCormick, from time to time, does seem to harbor a secret longing for proletarians in place of
plebeians, living amicably and alone in a classless, post-political, Marxist utopia.
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